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ABSTRACT 
Effects of Multiple Races and Header Highlighting on Undervotes in the 2006 Sarasota 
General Election: A Usability Study and Cognitive Modeling Assessment 
by 
Kristen K. Greene 
Large-scale voting usability problems have changed the outcomes of several 
recent elections. The 2006 election in Sarasota County, Florida was one such incident, 
where the number of votes lost was nearly 50 times greater than the margin of victory for 
the US Representative race. Multiple hypotheses were proposed to explain this incident, 
with prevailing theories focused on malicious software, touchscreen miscalibration, or 
poor ballot design. Study 1 aimed to empirically determine whether Sarasota voters 
unintentionally skipped the critical US Representative race due to poor ballot design. The 
Sarasota ballot was replicated initially, then header highlighting and number of races 
presented on the first screen were manipulated. While the presentation of multiple races 
had a significant effect on undervotes in the US Representative race, header highlighting 
did not. Nearly 20% of all voters (27 of 137) skipped the race their first time on that 
screen, an even greater undervote rate than that originally seen in Sarasota. In 
conjunction with other research, Study 1 results strongly suggests that the 2006 Sarasota 
election was almost certainly a human factors problem. A cognitive model of human 
voters was developed based on Study 1 data. Model predictions were then compared with 
behavioral data from Study 2, in which participants voted on a replica of the Charlotte 
County, Florida 2006 ballot. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the Help America Vote Act was passed in 2002, traditional voting systems 
(paper ballots, punch cards, and lever machines) were largely replaced with new direct-
recording electronic voting machines (DREs) (United States Government [US Gov.], 
2002). It was widely assumed that DREs would be more usable than the technologies 
they were replacing, yet usability problems with DREs in recent elections have been of 
even greater magnitude than usability issues seen previously with older voting methods. 
The 2006 election in Sarasota County, Florida was one such incident, where the number 
of votes lost was nearly 50 times greater than the margin of victory for the US 
Representative race. Although large-scale voting usability problems have changed the 
outcomes of several recent elections, existing accounts of usability failures in voting only 
address what happened when voters were confronted with various poor ballot designs, 
while explanations of why certain design features consistently result in specific types of 
voter errors are lacking. Furthermore, voting usability issues are currently addressed only 
post-election. In the future, a means of assessing usability pre-election is needed, to help 
prevent the reoccurrence of large-scale usability problems similar to those seen in recent 
elections. In order to achieve this long-term goal, a more thorough knowledge of how 
various ballot design characteristics affect voter performance is necessary. The current 
studies evaluated several ballot design principles, in an effort to help differentiate 
between multiple hypotheses proposed to explain a recent DRE usability problem from 
the 2006 Sarasota election. In Study I, human participants voted on a ballot design 
analogous to the problematic real-world original. Based on Study I data, a cognitive 
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model was constructed by synthesizing knowledge of general u ability design principles 
with knowledge of human attention and perception. The model as then used to predict 
effects on human performance expected with novel interface ch ges. Human 
participants voted on ballots with those identical interface chan es in Study 2, and model 
predictions were compared to human data. 
In general, methodology for the current studies was hea ily based on a previous 
series of experiments. Therefore, the following literature revie begins with a summary 
of relevant experimental studies that directly measured voting s 
Subsequent sections review field studies that examined usabili via indirect methods (i.e. 
the residual vote), with special emphasis on the ballot design an competing hypotheses 
from the election that motivated these studies. 
Direct evaluation of voting system usability: Experimental data 
In order to determine whether new electronic voting sys ems actually offer 
usability improvements over traditional voting methods, it is ne essary to have baseline 
usability data for both the newer and older technologies. In the ust of a series of studies, 
Everett, Byrne, and Greene (2006) began to address this need £ r baseline data, by 
comparing the usability of three different styles of paper ballots open response ballots, 
bubble ballots, and arrow ballots. Usability was assessed via ba lot completion times, 
error rates, and participants' responses to a standardized satisfa ion questionnaire, the 
System Usability Scale (SUS) (Brooke, 2006). These measures ddressed the 
recommendation by the National Institute for Standards and Te hnology (NIST) that 
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usability be evaluated using three metrics suggested by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO): efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfaction (Laskowski et aI., 2004). 
Neither efficiency (ballot con1pletion time) nor effectiveness (error rate) were affected by 
the type of paper ballot used in the 2006 study by Everett et aL However, voting method 
did have a significant effect on satisfaction, with the bubble ballot receiving the highest 
SUS scores of the three paper ballots. The open response and arrow ballots could not be 
distinguished from one another in terms of subjective preference. While error rates were 
not significantly different depending on which type of paper ballot was used, over 11 % of 
ballots completed contained at least one error. Such high error rates were disturbing, 
given that participants in this study were comprised of Rice University undergraduates, 
an extremely intelligent and highly educated sample. 
In a subsequent study, Greene, Byrne, and Everett (2006) used participants more 
representative of the voting public, by srunpling from the general population in Houston, 
Texas. This study examined the usability of mechanical lever machines, as well as two of 
the three previously shldied paper ballots: the bubble and arrow style ballots. Although 
voting n1ethod again had no significant impact on efficiency or effectiveness, nearly 160/0 
of all ballots cast contained at least one error. Again, voting method had a marked impact 
on satisfaction. Participants were by far most satisfied with the bubble ballot, and least 
satisfied with the lever Inachine. In a later study, Byrne, Greene, and Everett (2007) 
added the use of punch cards to their voting usability research. Consistent with prior 
results, the bubble ballot again received significantly higher SUS scores than did the lever 
machine, punch card, or arrow ballot. The percentage of ballots containing at least one 
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error was higher than in previous studies (26%), although no voting method was more or 
less prone to generating errors. 
In 2008, Everett and colleagues conducted their first study directly comparing the 
usability of older voting systems with newer electronic voting technology, by evaluating 
bubble ballots, lever machines, punch cards, and a new prototype DRE. Differences in 
efficiency and effectiveness were small between the various voting methods. However, 
the DRE elicited significantly higher SUS scores than did any of the older voting 
methods. As in previous studies, the bubble ballot again received high SUS scores, but it 
was no longer participants' favorite once they voted with the new DRE. While the DRE 
enjoyed a large advantage in terms of subjective usability ratings, it did not have any 
corresponding objective performance benefits. Such a disassociation between subjective 
and objective usability is not uncommon (Frokjaer, Hertzum, & Hornbaek, 2000). 
While Everett and colleagues (2008) used a prototype DRE developed in-house, 
other researchers have used commercially available DREs. Hermson and colleagues 
(2008) included a variety of commercial DREs in a large-scale usability evaluation of six 
electronic voting systems and four verification systems. They used several different 
methods of evaluation: expert reviews, a laboratory experiment, and a field study. In their 
laboratory experiment, 42 participants voted on six different DREs: a Diebold Accuvote-
TS, an ES&S Model 100, a Hart InterCivic eSlate, an Avante Vote-trakker, a Nedap 
Liberty Vote, and a Zoomable prototype developed specifically for the authors. The ballot 
used fictional candidate names, and contained 18 offices and four ballot questions. 
Participants were given a voter guide and asked to circle their choices and keep it with 
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them while they voted, but were instructed who to vote for in some races, and were asked 
to do a write-in, change a vote, and intentionally omit a down-ballot race. Allowing 
people to make their own selections, but then telling them to change those selections in 
certain ways, was a slightly odd aspect of the study methodology. Another 
methodological issue was the study's use of a non-standardized questionnaire to evaluate 
subjective usability. Had voter satisfaction been measured via a standardized instrument, 
such as the SUS, it would have facilitated more accurate comparison across future studies 
and different methodologies. One final concern with the Hermson et al. (2008) study is 
the lack of efficiency data for any of the voting systems; if ballot completion times were 
recorded, they were not published. 
Despite these limitations, the Hermson et al. (2008) study was a milestone in 
voting system usability research. When voters were not asked to perform any special 
tasks and were given a standard office-bloc ballot design, ballots were cast accurately 
over 97% of the time, with few differences between voting systems. However, when 
voters were asked to do any special tasks (change a choice, vote straight-party ticket, or 
select multiple candidates), accuracy dropped noticeably, down to 80-90%. Furthermore, 
sharp differences emerged between voting systems, with the Avante's accuracy rate at 
only 50%, and the Hart InterCivic's rate at 72%. Approximately 20% of voters cast 
ballots that were not entirely accurate. Voters seemed insensitive to these objective 
usability differences; they rated all six DREs favorably and had high confidence with the 
touch screen systems, even judging them as more trustworthy than paper. This 
disassociation between objective and subjective usability with DREs is similar to 
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previous findings by Everett and colleagues using a prototype DRE (2008). 
The ability to measure both objective and subjective usability has been a major 
contribution of laboratory experiments in the voting arena. Despite NIST's 
recommendation that usability be assessed via metrics of efficiency, effectiveness, and 
satisfaction, data from studies that directly measured all three aspects of usability remain 
relatively scarce. Indirect measures of usability are much more common, but they are 
generally limited to a single facet of usability, that of effectiveness. Although use of the 
residual vote as an indirect measure of accuracy (i.e. effectiveness) is a long-standing 
tradition in the Political Science domain, the residual vote has not traditionally been 
discussed explicitly as a method for assessing "usability" per se. Nonetheless, this 
indirect measure has consistently been a viable means of drawing attention to usability 
problems post-election, as described in the following section. 
Indirect evaluation of voting system usability: Field data on the residual vote 
Given the decentralized nature of election administration in America, election 
policies and procedures can vary widely between jurisdictions, with voting systems and 
ballot designs that differ both between and within states. When a given state has 
neighboring counties comprised of voting populations with similar characteristics 
(socioeconomic status, political preference, ethnicity, etc.), one would expect election 
results to be similar between counties. When large and unexpected differences in election 
results occur between neighboring counties, or between a single county in comparison to 
its state, it causes voters and candidates alike to question the legitimacy of the election. 
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This has happened repeatedly in recent years, which has greatly increased national 
interest in voting systems. Much of this public interest has been focused on auditability 
and potential security vulnerabilities of newer direct recording electronic voting machines 
(DREs), with little focus on usability and human factors. This is surprising, given that 
poor ballot design, rather than failed or compromised technology, has been the most 
likely cause of aberrant and questionable results in numerous elections. In several notable 
cases, the number of votes lost due to poor ballot design far outnumbered the margin of 
victory. 
The number of lost or unrecorded votes, termed the residual vote rate, is an 
indirect measure of voter error commonly used in Political Science. It is typically 
calculated as the difference between voter turnout and the number of valid votes actually 
cast for any given race, and is used to compare accuracy between different voting 
methods (Kimball & Kropf, 2005). The residual vote is comprised of both undervotes and 
overvotes. Undervoting occurs if a voter makes no selection at all for a given race. An 
undervote can be either intentional or unintentional. Many voters plan only to vote in the 
presidential race and then skip the remaining down-ballot races; their down-ballot 
undervotes would be intentional omissions rather than errors. On the other hand, 
numerous voters plan to make a selection in every race, making their undervotes true 
errors. Without a way to ascertain voter intent, one cannot disentangle intentional 
omissions from undervote errors. In contrast to an undervote, an overvote occurs if a 
voter selects more than the allowed number of options for a particular race. For example, 
choosing more than one candidate for president would mean neither vote was recorded 
for that race. 
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Residual vote rates of greater than one percent are rare for "top-of-the-ticket" 
races, especially for president. Although the residual vote is not a direct measure of voter 
error, unusually high residual vote rates have repeatedly proven useful in elucidating 
problems post-election. The Brennan Center for Justice (2008) examined ballots from 
counties with abnormally high residual vote rates, and found those counties had 
inevitably used poorly designed ballots in comparison to their neighboring county or their 
state. The Brennan Center report presents several general ballot design problems, 
supported by specific examples of ballots used and their corresponding election 
outcomes. Likely the most well-known ofthose incidents detailed in the report was the 
use of the "butterfly ballot" in the 2000 general election in Palm Beach County, Florida. 
Effects of the "butterfly ballot" have been discussed prior to the Brennan Center report 
(Wand et aI., 2001), and this incident may arguably be one of the most publicly 
memorable large-scale examples of a design error that resulted in reduced usability for 
thousands of voters. 
The butterfly ballot used a single column of punch holes flanked by two columns 
of candidate names for the same office (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The "butterfly ballot" used in Palm Beach County, Florida, 2000. 
The flanking pages are analogous to butterfly wings. This is a non-user friendly design 
because the punch holes are alternately for the left and right pages of the ballot, which 
does not lnap onto the manner in which many voters would vote the ballot. Americans 
read left to right, top to bottom on a column/page before moving to the adjacent column/ 
page. If voters made their choices in this lnanner, they would have perceived that 
punching the fIrst hole corresponded to a vote for Bush, and that punching the second 
hole conesponded to a vote for Gore. Yet in reality, punching the second hole would have 
resulted in a vote for Buchanan. Although someone voting Republican would still vote 
correctly for Bush, someone voting Democrat would erroneously vote for Buchanan 
rather than Gore. 
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Indeed, it was estimated that over 2,000 Democratic voters mistakenly selected 
Buchanan when using the "butterfly ballot." Buchanan received 3,411 votes in Palm 
Beach County, which was over three times the number he received in other Florida 
counties. The residual vote rate in Palm Beach County was 6.2%, whereas the residual 
vote rate for the state was only 2.9%. There were 28,746 residual votes in the county, and 
the margin of victory in the state was only 537 votes (Brennan Center for Justice, 2008). 
Significant statistical evidence suggests that if precinct-tabulated optical scan ballots had 
been used throughout Florida, Al Gore would have been elected president rather than 
George Bush, with a margin of victory of over 30,000 votes (Mebane, 2004). 
Palm Beach County was not the only Florida county to split candidates for the 
same office onto different pages in the 2000 general election. Duval County also used a 
two-page ballot design that year, splitting the ten presidential candidates across pages by 
listing five on the first page and five on the second page. Almost 22,000 votes were not 
counted, because people chose one candidate on the first page, then chose yet another 
candidate on the second page. This ballot design was used in an area of the state where 
Democrats had launched an aggressive campaign to register new voters, with voter 
education materials reminding people to "vote that second place." The residual vote rate 
in Duval County was 9.3% for president, compared to only 2.9% statewide (Brennan 
Center for Justice, 2008). 
Although the election issues in Palm Beach and Duval Florida counties arose due 
to splitting candidate names for a single race across multiple pages of a ballot, merely 
ensuring that all candidate names for a given race are displayed on one page does not 
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guarantee a well-designed layout. For example, even when a ballot uses only a single 
page, it can be problematic to split candidates for one race across two columns. This 
occurred in the 2002 general election in Kewaunee County, Wisconsin, where the paper 
ballot split the race for governor into two columns. The residual vote rate for that contest 
was a surprising 11.8% in the county, but only 1.1 % statewide. The number of votes lost 
for that race in Kewaunee County (over 700) was larger than the margin of victory there 
(only 400 votes), although the state overall was won by a comfortable margin (Brennan 
Center for Justice, 2008). The finding that greater numbers of unrecorded votes occur 
with ballots that list candidates for the same office in multiple columns or on multiple 
pages has been reported previously (Sinclair & Alvarez, 2004). 
Optical scan ballots commonly present the voter with multiple columns of races 
and candidate names on a single sheet, but what is less common and quite problematic is 
the placement of response options on both sides of candidate names. This ballot design 
flaw occurred in Hamilton County, Illinois in the 2002 general election (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Section of the ballot used in Hamilton County, Illinois, 2002. 
The first and second columns of the Hamilton County ballot had races that lined up 
exactly next to one another. Numerous voters erroneously marked the arrow to the right 
of a candidate's name rather than to arrow to the left, likely due to the fact that people 
read from left to right, combined with the limited spacing between columns that made it 
difficult to tell which arrow corresponded to exactly which candidate name. Two races 
were affected by the poor ballot design in Hamilton County: the race for U.S. Senate, as 
well as the race for Governor. The residual vote rate in Hamilton County was 9.3% for 
the U.S. Senate race, compared to only 4.50/0 statewide. Similarly, the county's residual 
vote rate was 5.00/0 for Governor, compared to 3.1 % statewide (Brennan Center for 
Justice, 2008). 
12 
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In general, "complete-the-arrow" style ballots have higher residual vote rates than 
do "fill-the-oval" style ballots (Kimball & Kropf, 2005). This may be in part due to 
voters' greater familiarity with the task of darkening a bubble, such as on many 
standardized tests, than with completing the missing section of an arrow. To compare 
residual vote rates between complete-the-arrow and fill-the-oval style ballots, the 
Brennan Center for Justice (2008) studied 641 counties using precinct count optical 
systems and 767 counties using central count optical scan systems. The Brennan Center 
found that in the 2004 general election, complete-the-arrow style ballots had a residual 
vote rate of 0.9% with precinct count optical scan systems, whereas fill-the-oval style 
ballots had a residual vote rate of 0.6%. The same pattern of poorer performance with 
complete-the-arrow ballots existed when considering central count optical scan systems 
as well; with central count systems, the residual vote rate for complete-the-arrow ballots 
was 2.3%, versus 1.6% for fill-the-oval ballots. It was suggested that the use of central 
count optical scan machines increased the difference in residual vote rates seen between 
the two ballot styles because voters do not have an opportunity to correct their errors with 
central count systems. When central count systems are used, they often tabulate votes cast 
in different polling places, or those received via absentee ballots. 
The Brennan Center for Justice (2008) used a different data set from the 2004 
election to illustrate yet another ballot design flaw, that of leaving columns or rows for 
disqualified candidates. This occurred in Montgomery County, Ohio, when Ralph Nader 
was disqualified from the presidential ballot. Rather than entirely removing the affected 
row from the ballot, several counties instead used the words "Candidate Removed" in 
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place of Ralph Nader 's name. This was done because many voting machines had already 
been programmed to scan ballots that included Ralph Nader as a candidate. Because 
election laws in Ohio mandate that names of candidates are rotated by precinct, every 
fifth precinct in Montgomery County, Ohio, used ballots with the "Candidate Removed" 
format pictured in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Section froin one of several ballot formats used in Montgomery County, Ohio, 
2004. 
Higher numbers of overvotes occurred in precincts using this ordering of candidate 
nalnes, which may have been due to the visual grouping effect the "Candidate Removed" 
line had on the remaining candidate options. Voters may have interpreted the two visual 
groupings as two separate races, one between Bush and Kerry, and the other between 
Peroutka and Badnarik. By selecting two candidates (in what a voter thought was two 
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separate races) for president, neither vote would actually have been recorded (Brennan 
Center for Justice, 2008). About 2.6% of the voters in the 33 Dayton precincts using this 
ballot rotation overvoted in the presidential race. In contrast, only 1.1 % of voters in the 
Dayton precincts using other ballot rotations overvoted in that race (Jacobs, 2005). 
The Brennan Center report (2008) also describes several cases where ballots 
failed to use shading and bolding to help voters differentiate between voting tasks. In 
Escambia County, Florida, the ballot used in the 2002 general election lacked any sort of 
shading to help voters differentiate between races. Residual vote rates with this unshaded 
ballot were higher than in neighboring Bay County, where the ballot's shading aided 
voters in differentiating between the various races (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Ballot sections from Escambia County (left) and Bay County (right), Florida, 
2002. 
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More specifically, the residual vote rate in Escambia County for the Attorney General 
race was 2.50/0, whereas it was 2.2% in Bay County. Similarly, the residual vote rate in 
Escambia County for the Commissioner of Agriculture race was 4.60/0, versus 4.30/0 in 
nearby Bay County (Brelman Center for Justice, 2008). 
The influence of ballot formatting on the residual vote is not a new finding by any 
means. In fact, effects of inconsistent ballot headings in the 1976 general election in Los 
Angeles County, California, were much larger than any of the incidents described in 
preceding paragraphs. As can be seen in Figure 5, the 1976 Los Angeles County ballot 
used office title and instructions that were presented above candidate names for the 
presidential race, whereas that information was presented to the left of candidate names 
for the U.S. Senate race. 
Figure 5. Section of the ballot used in Los Angeles County, California, 1976. 
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This inconsistent use of headings resulted in an exceedingly high 17.0% residual vote rate 
in Los Angeles County for the Senate race, whereas the rate statewide was only 4.1 %. 
The number of votes lost in the county (436,864 votes) far exceeded the margin of 
victory for the Senate candidate in the state (246,111 votes) (Brennan Center for Justice, 
2008). 
Of all the incidents detailed in the Brennan Center report and described in 
preceding paragraphs, the 2000 "butterfly ballot" is perhaps the ballot design fiasco most 
well-known by the voting public. However, the actual difference in presidential residual 
vote rates between Palm Beach County and the state of Florida was quite small (3.3%) in 
comparison to similar effects seen in recent elections using poorly designed DREs. For 
example, a difference in residual vote rates of 11.4% was seen in the 2006 general 
election in Sarasota County, Florida. While the first DRE screen voters saw only had a 
single race on it, the second screen they saw had two races on it (Figure 6). The residual 
vote rate for US Representative, the top race on the two-race screen, was 13.9% for 
Sarasota County voters using DREs with this screen layout. In sharp contrast, the residual 
vote rate for this race was only 2.5% for Sarasota County voters using provisional or 
absentee ballots. The residual vote rate for this race in nearby Charlotte County was also 
2.5%. This fact is quite important, because DREs in Charlotte County displayed the US 
Representative race alone on a separate page. In the Sarasota 2006 election, the number 
of votes lost far outnumbered the margin of victory: the margin of victory for US 
Representative was only 369 votes, whereas the number of residual votes was 18,413 
(Brennan Center for Justice, 2008). 
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An even larger effect of poor DRE ballot design was seen in the 2006 general 
election in Charlotte County, Florida, where the difference in residual vote rates for the 
Attorney General race between the county and the state was 16%. The DREs used in 
Charlotte County presented the races for Governor and Attorney General on the same 
screen (Figure 7). 
Figure 7. DRE screen fronl Charlotte County ballot, Florida, 2006. 
The residual vote rate in Charlotte County for the bottom-most of those two races (i.e. 
Attorney General's office) was extremely high, 20.9%. That rate statewide was only 
4.9%, and it was only 4.3% in nearby Sarasota County, where the ballot used displayed 
those two races on separate screens. 
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The Sarasota election gave rise to nluch controversy when competing 
explanations were proposed to account for the US Representative race results: malicious/ 
 in . 
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malfunctioning software, touchscreen miscalibrationiinsensitivity, voter apathy, and poor 
ballot design. 
Although some have suggested that malicious/malfunctioning software could have 
been to blame in the Sarasota and Charlotte County incidents, it remains more than likely 
that ballot design had at least some effect on voter performance. Multiple hypotheses 
have been proposed regarding which specific design flaws were responsible, yet no 
studies have directly examined them. In addition to the desire to differentiate between 
these multiple hypotheses (which are discussed in the following section), the Sarasota 
County ballot was chosen as the basis for the current studies due to the sheer magnitude 
of its effects on election results, and also because it could be compared to an almost 
perfectly inverse design in the Charlotte County ballot. Finally, because DREs are more 
similar than older voting methods are to the graphical user interfaces (GUIs) traditionally 
studied in the field of HCI/HF, knowledge gained from the current studies has greater 
potential for wider applicability in the larger HCIIHF community. 
Study rationale 
Several different hypotheses have been proposed to explain the Sarasota County 
undervote rates seen with the critical two-race screen, yet there are insufficient data to 
support or refute any or all of them. Many people suggested that malicious or 
malfunctioning DRE software was to blame. These claims could not be proven, as DRE 
vendors did not disclose the necessary source code for examination by computer security 
experts; ES&S successfully invoked the trade-secret privilege during post-election 
l
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litigation (Amunson & Hirsch, 2008). Other people proposed that voters simply did not 
know anything about the candidates, and therefore intentionally omitted the race in 
question. This suggestion is unfounded, given the expensive and ubiquitous nature of the 
campaign for that office. At the time, it was the single most expensive non-presidential 
election in the history of the United States. Of greater interest and relevance for the 
current studies are the multiple hypotheses suggesting that various ballot design issues 
were at fault. 
It has been hypothesized that "banner blindness" was to blame for the large 
number of voters who did not choose a candidate in the US Representative race in 
Sarasota County, 2006. Just as web searchers often fail to notice links at the top of web 
pages (Benway & Lane, 1998), so too could voters have failed to notice the race at the 
top of the DRE screen. This idea could be tested simply by displaying each race on its 
own screen. A second hypothesis proposed that inconsistent layout was at fault: the first 
screen voters saw only had a single race on it, therefore they were expecting only a single 
race on the second screen as well. This might be examined by varying the number of 
races on the first screen (one versus multiple), as well as by varying the number of 
screens before the critical two-race screen. A third hypothesis suggested that inconsistent 
use of highlighting was the problem: on the first screen, the race heading "Congressional" 
was highlighted in blue above the Senator race, but this heading was not present above 
the congressional race (US Representative) on the second screen. While the 
"Congressional" header was absent above the top race on this critical second screen, the 
"State" header above the bottom-most race was present and highlighted. Effects of 
t
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highlighting on visual attention could be examined in several ways. One could remove 
the highlighting and keep the race headers as they were initially, one could remove the 
highlighting while adding the missing Congressional header, or one could do away with 
the headers entirely. 
Although descriptions of the possible explanations for the Sarasota County ballot 
effects abound, ranging from news articles (Doig, 2006) to columns by well-known 
usability experts (Nielson, 2007), no studies have directly examined the different 
hypotheses. Was it banner blindness, inconsistent layout, or inconsistent highlighting at 
play in Sarasota County? Was it an additive or interactive combination of the three? If so, 
which factor most influences human performance and why? Understanding the exact 
mechanisms by which particular design characteristics affect voter error remains an open 
empirical issue. While there is ample information detailing what happened in elections 
such as Sarasota County, there is no corresponding literature explaining exactly why 
voters made these errors. There is clearly a need for a theoretically sound, empirically 
generated explanation of why various types of poor ballot design consistently result in 
specific classes of voter errors. Rationale for the current studies stemmed from a desire to 
begin addressing this larger issue, by starting with a specific real-world ballot design 
problem. A brief summary is below, with a more detailed description in subsequent 
sections. 
Study 1 sought to shed light on the viability of the various hypotheses discussed 
above. Participants voted on a DRE with a critical two-race screen similar to the 2006 
Sarasota County ballot. Highlighting was manipulated, as well as the number of races 
.. 
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presented on the screen preceding the critical two-race screen. An ACT-R cognitive 
model was then constructed based on Study I human behavioral data. The model was 
then run with a novel variation of the Study 1 ballot, in an attempt to predict the human 
performance changes that one would expect to see with altered interface designs. Study 2 
collected behavioral data to which model predictions were then compared. 
STUDY 1 
Method 
Participants 
Participants for Study 1 were 144 adults recruited from the larger Houston 
population. The primary recruiting method was a paid advertisement in the Houston 
Chronicle. Additional recruiting methods included placing a paid advertisement on 
Craig's List online, and contacting people who previously expressed interest in our 
research but had not yet participated. Participants were compensated $25 cash for the 
one-hour study. Participant eligibility requirements were as follows: must have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, be at least 18 years of age, be a US citizen fluent in English, 
and not have participated in any of our previous voting studies. Of the 144 total 
participants, 76 were female and 68 were male. Ages ranged from 18-84 years, with a 
mean age of 46.8 (SD=17.6 years), and median age of 48 years. Participants were diverse 
in terms of education, ethnicity, income, and voting experience. 
1 
i 'S
24 
Design 
A mixed design with one within-subjects variable and three between-subjects 
variables was used. The within-subjects variable was "DRE versus punch card," since 
each participant completed the same ballot two times: once with a DRE and once with a 
punch card. While previous research tested three different non-DRE voting methods-
paper ballots, lever machines, and punch cards-the current studies used only punch 
cards, as they most closely resemble the DRE in terms of task structure and visual 
presentation of information. Lever machines are full-face ballots: the entire ballot is 
displayed at once, and this information is ever-present. Similarly, voters see multiple 
races simultaneously when using bubble ballots (although these may not be entirely full-
faced if the paper must be turned over). The simultaneous presentation of numerous races 
by a lever machine or bubble ballot would have been very different from the Sarasota 
County DRE ballot of interest, where only one or two races were presented 
simultaneously on the screens of primary interest. The maximum number of partisan 
races per screen was limited to three. By showing only one or two races per booklet page, 
punch cards easily mimicked the DRE's method of presenting only a limited amount of 
information at once. For this reason, punch cards were the sole non-DRE voting method 
used in Study 1. In addition to displaying the same number of races per page as the DRE, 
punch cards were also analogous to the DRE in terms of font styles, colors, spacing, etc. 
(Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Picture of punch card used in Study 1. 
The first between-subjects variable was information condition: a third of 
participants were in the directed information condition, while the remaining two-thirds 
were in the undirected information condition. In the directed condition, participants were 
given a sheet of paper listing exactly what selections they were to make while completing 
each ballot. Participants kept this paper with them while voting, and the experimenter 
stressed before each ballot that participants were to make only the choices listed, 
regardless of their personal political preference. More explicitly, because participants 
were instructed to intentionally omit certain races based on real-world roll-off rates 
(Nichols and Strizek, 1995), the directed condition in Study 1 could more accurately be 
termed "directed with roll-off." However, for the sake of simplicity, it will henceforth be 
referred to as the "directed" information condition. 
.
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In the undirected information condition, participants were offered a voter guide 
and allowed to make candidate selections based on personal political preference. Voter 
guides were similar to those used in previous studies, which were based on guides put 
forth by the League of Women Voters. All participants in the undirected information 
condition were instructed to vote consistently, i.e. to select the same candidates on their 
second ballot as they chose on their first ballot. Participants were reminded to vote 
consistently before receiving each ballot. The undirected information condition was then 
further subdivided: half of participants in the undirected condition were explicitly told to 
make a choice in every race. The other half of participants in the undirected condition 
were simply instructed to vote as they would in a real election. For example, "if you 
would normally make a selection in every race, please do so"; "if you normally skip 
races, please do not make selections for those races". Participants were randomly 
assigned to information conditions. 
The second between-subjects variable was the number of races displayed on the 
first DRE voting screen, which was the page immediately following the instructions 
screen. Half of participants was two races on their first voting screen (Figure 9), while the 
other half of participants saw only a single race on their first voting screen (Figure 10). 
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PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Gordon Bearce (Vote for One) REP 
Nathan Maclean 
Vernon Stanley Albury DEM 
Richard Rigby 
Janette Froman NPA 
Chris Aponte 
\.Jrite- in 
CONGRESSIONAL 
UNITED STATES SENATOR 
Fern Brzezinski (Vote for One) REP 
Ce 1 ice Cad ieux DEM 
Glen Travis Lozier NPA 
Corey Dery NPA 
Rick Stickles NPA 
Maurice Humble NPA 
IJl'ite- in 
Previous Page 1 of 6 Page 
Figure 9. Two races on first screen of Study 1 DRE. 
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The final between-subjects variable was the manipulation of highlighting on the 
race category headings. Half of all participants saw the race headings of "Congressional" 
and "State" highlighted in blue as they were on the actual Sarasota County 2006 DRE 
ballot: this condition was called "original Sarasota highlighting". It should be emphasized 
that there was no heading at all above the US Representative race on the original Sarasota 
DRE ballot, nor was there in Study 1. In contrast to the original Sarasota highlighting, 
headings seen by the remaining half of participants were not highlighted at all, including 
both the race category headings and the overall ballot heading (see Appendices for 
screenshots of Study 1 DRE ballot in its entirety). 
There were several dependent variables measured, which remain consistent with 
those from prior research: ballot completion time, errors, and satisfaction. These three 
variables are in keeping with the ISO usability metrics recommended by NIST: 
efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfaction. Overall ballot completion times were measured 
in seconds, and assessed the total time it took a participant to complete a single ballot. 
DRE ballot completion times were recorded automatically by the DRE software, whereas 
the experimenter recorded punch card ballot completion times by hand via stopwatch. In 
addition to overall DRE ballot completion times, per-screen and per-race times were 
measured for the DRE (in milliseconds). Of particular interest were per-screen times for 
the second voting screen, which presented the critical US Representative race. 
The most important dependent variable in this study was error rates. The wayan 
error was determined differed based on a participant's assigned information condition, 
since determining voter error hinges on knowing voter intent. In the directed information 
29 
condition, voters intend to make the selections listed on the sheet they are given. 
Therefore, any selections other than those listed are considered errors. If participants 
chose a different candidate than the one listed, that was termed a "wrong choice" error. If 
they failed to make a selection where one was indicated on their sheet, that was counted 
as an "undervote" error. Finally, if they made a selection for a race their sheet instructed 
them to omit, that was classified as an "extra vote" error. 
In the undirected information condition, voters intend to choose the same 
candidates on the DRE and the punch card. Therefore, discrepancies between ballots 
were considered errors. Determining which voting method the error should be attributed 
to was accomplished via an exit interview. In the undirected information condition only, 
participants completed an exit interview after finishing their second ballot. An exit 
interview was necessary to determine voter intent by majority rule. For example, if a 
voter selected candidate A on the DRE, candidate B on the punch card, then stated that 
they voted for candidate A during the exit interview, the error would be attributed to the 
punch card. As previously described for the directed information condition, the same 
distinction was drawn between "wrong choice," "undervote," and "extra vote" errors in 
the undirected condition. 
Regardless of information condition, there was a fourth type of error that voters 
could make with the punch card that could not occur with the DRE: an "overvote" error. 
An overvote occurred when a participant made more than the allowed number of choices 
for a race. For both Study 1 and Study 2, all races were single-selection races, meaning 
voters could choose at most one candidate per race. While DRE software prevents 
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selection of more than one candidate for the same race (lever machines prevent this error 
n1echanically), punch cards (and paper ballots) do not have an analogous prevention 
mechanism. It is quite possible for participants to punch multiple holes (or fill-in multiple 
bubbles) for a single race, so Studies 1 and 2 both recorded "overvote" errors for the 
punch card and bubble ballot respectively, as well as the afore-mentioned "wrong 
choice," "undervote," and "extra vote" errors. 
Two unique error types were of particular interest in Study 1. The first and most 
important error was whether participants skipped the critical US Representative race. 
This race was extremely important, as it was the top-most of the two races seen on the 
critical Sarasota-like race screen (Figure 11). 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS 
13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 
(Vote for One) 
Shane Terrio REP D 
Cassie Principe DEM D 
STATE 
GOVERNOR AND LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 
(Vote for One) 
Pedro Brouse REP D Robert Mettler 
Tim Speight DEM D Rick Organ 
Therese Gustin REF D Greg Converse 
Sam Saddler NPA D Elise Ellzey 
Polly Rylander NPA D Roberto Aron 
Jillian Balas NPA D Zachary Minick 
\.Irite- in D 
Previous Page 2 of 6 Next Page Page 
Figure 11. Study 1 DRE critical race screen. 
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The second error type of particular interest was whether voters failed to cast their ballot 
with the DRE. Failure to cast a ballot after making selections has been seen in real-world 
elections, called the "fleeing voter" problem, and has also been documented in recent 
experimental research (Greene, 2008). 
In addition to measuring errors and ballot completion time, voter satisfaction was 
assessed. Satisfaction was evaluated using the System Usability Scale (Brooke, 1996). 
Participants completed two separate SUS questionnaires: the first was completed 
immediately after voting with the DRE, and the second immediately after voting with the 
punch card. 
Materials and procedure 
The punch cards and DRE hardware for the current studies were those used in 
previous research. Punch cards were purchased at auction from Brazoria County, Texas. 
The DRE was a desktop PC running Windows as its basic operating system, with a 17-
inch LCD monitor. Adobe Flash was used to create and display the DRE ballots, and to 
record a time-stamped log of all user actions. A subset of the same fictitious candidate 
names from prior studies were used, although no propositions were included. Candidate 
names were arranged to make the DRE screens as similar as possible to the Sarasota 2006 
ballot. 
Participants began the study by completing the informed consent procedure, then 
were given a sheet of instructions to read. The experimenter then verbally reviewed the 
instructions and answered any participant questions. The exact wording of instructions 
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differed slightly between the two information conditions. As previously mentioned, 
participants in the directed information condition were instructed to vote by making only 
the selections listed on the sheet they were given. In the undirected condition, half of 
participants were instructed to make a selection in every race, while the other half were 
told to vote as they normally would in a real election. All participants in the undirected 
condition were reminded to be consistent in their selections across ballots. 
After giving informed consent and receiving instructions, participants in the 
undirected information condition were offered a voter guide. If they chose to read it, they 
were given ample opportunity to do so, and were allowed to write on it and keep it with 
them as they voted. Instead of a voter guide, participants in the directed information 
condition received a sheet of paper listing all the selections they were to make while 
voting. After receiving the appropriate document for their assigned information condition, 
participants were shown to a voting station. DRE ballots and punch cards were both 
completed on waist-high tables; participants remained standing while voting in order to 
more closely simulate a real election. 
After participants voted on the DRE, they completed a SUS questionnaire to 
assess their satisfaction with that voting method. The SUS is a simple la-question scale, 
using questions like "I thought the system was easy to use" and "I felt very confident 
using the system." People respond using a Likert scale of one to five to indicate whether 
they "strongly disagree" or "strongly agree" with each statement. Ratings are combined 
into a single number, ranging from a to 100, with higher numbers indicative of greater 
user satisfaction (Brooke, 1996). After completing the SUS for the DRE ballot, 
10-q
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participants then voted on the punch card, followed by another SUS questionnaire. 
Participants in the undirected information condition then completed an exit interview. 
During the exit interview, participants were given a sheet listing all the races and 
candidate names they saw while voting. Participants verbally indicated the selections they 
made and the experimenter circled those choices on her own sheet. 
Regardless of information condition, all participants completed a final survey 
packet, which included voting-specific questions, as well as basic demographic questions. 
Examples include questions on number of elections voted in, experience with different 
voting methods, age, education, computer expertise, etc. Of note, participants were asked 
explicitly whether they voted in every race on the DRE, as well as whether they voted in 
every race on the punch card. After completion of the final survey, participants were 
debriefed and paid. 
Results 
Effectiveness 
Of the 144 total participants run, seven were not included in the following error 
analyses. Five participants were not included due to problems recording their DRE data 
in Flash, while the remaining two participants were excluded due to being outliers, 
defined as having error rates greater than 15% on both voting methods. This outlier 
definition is in keeping with prior research. 
Effectiveness: Critical Race Results 
On the DRE, twenty-seven of 137 voters skipped the US Representative race their 
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first time on that screen, resulting in an initial omission rate of 19.71 %. Of those 27 
voters, 20 corrected their critical race undervote error before casting their final ballot: 11 
of those 20 voters corrected their mistake pre-review screen, while nine did so post-
review screen. Seven of the 27 voters who skipped the US Representative race their first 
time on that screen did not correct their mistake, resulting in a final undervote rate of 
5.1 %. Of note, three of those seven voters were in the directed information condition, 
meaning that even when they had a sheet of paper listing the US Representative race in 
front of them, they skipped it nonetheless. On the punch card, two participants 
undervoted in the critical race: one was in the directed information condition, while the 
other was in the undirected condition. 
Effectiveness: What Predicted Skipping the Critical Race? 
The only significant predictor of whether people initially skipped the critical race 
on the DRE was the number of races seen on screen one. Nineteen of the 63 voters (30%) 
who saw a single race on their first voting screen initially skipped the critical race. In 
contrast, only eight of the 74 voters (11 %) who saw two races on their first screen did so. 
Critical race initial omissions were regressed on highlighting, number of races on screen 
one, information condition, education, and age (age as a continuous variable). All two-
way interaction terms were tested initially in the first block of a logistic regression: none 
were significant. All main effects were then similarly evaluated: the model was not 
significant overall (Chi-square(7, N = 137) = 9.85,p = .20), accounting for 11 % of the 
variance in predicting whether participants skipped the critical race. The main effect of 
number of Screen 1 races was significant, (b = 1.17, P =.014); people who saw a single 
t
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race on Screen 1 were more likely to skip the critical race than were people who saw two 
races on Screen 1. Although education did not reliably predict skipping the critical race 
(p = .48), voters with a postgraduate degree were somewhat less likely to make this error 
(Table 1). The main effect of age was not reliable (b = .001,p = .92), nor were the main 
effects of information condition (b = -.19,p =.71) or highlighting (b = .04,p =.93). 
Table 1. Education levels for participants who initially skipped the critical race. 
High Some Bachelor's Post-
school or college degree graduate 
less degree 
Count 8 of 26 90f46 8 of 47 2 of 18 
Percentage 31% 20% 17% 11% 
Effectiveness: Post-Completion Errors ("Fleeing Voter" Problem) 
Thirteen of 137 voters (9.5%) failed to cast their vote with the DRE. Education 
significantly predicted the failure to cast a ballot: voters with less education were more 
likely to make this error (Table 2). 
Table 2. Education levels for participants who failed to cast their DRE ballot. 
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High Some Bachelor's Post-
school or college degree graduate 
less degree 
Count 7 of 26 40f46 2 of 47 o of 18 
Percentage 27% 9% 4% 0% 
Failed to cast error rates were regressed on highlighting, number of races on 
screen one, information condition, education, and age (age as a continuous variable). All 
two-way interaction terms were tested initially in the first block of a logistic regression: 
none were significant. All main effects were then similarly evaluated: the model was 
significant overall (Chi-square(7, N = 137) = 21.36,p = .003), accounting for 31 % of the 
variance in predicting whether participants did or did not fail to cast their ballots. The fact 
that people with less education were significantly more likely to fail to cast their ballot 
(p = .05) is a result that would be expected given prior research. In contrast, finding that 
information condition significantly affected failure to cast a ballot (b = 1.50, P = .03) was 
rather unexpected: people in the directed condition were more likely to make this error, 
which has not been seen previously. Eight of the 42 people (19%) in the directed 
condition failed to cast their ballot; six of these people left it on the review screen and 
two of these people left it on the last race screen. Five of the 95 people (5%) in the 
undirected information condition failed to cast their ballots, four of whom left it on the 
review screen, whereas one person left it on the cast vote screen. However, the significant 
effect of information condition may have been an artifact of the experimental materials in 
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the directed condition, as the sheet listing the candidates people were to vote for in the 
directed condition instructed people to intentionally skip the last race. The main effect of 
age was not reliable (b = -.03,p = .17), nor were the main effects of highlighting (b = .49, 
p = .48) or number of Screen 1 races (b = -.74,p = .27). 
Effectiveness: Overall Error Rates 
Error rates were computed by dividing the number of errors made by the total 
number of opportunities for error. Participants who saw a single race on the first voting 
screen were presented with 13 races total, hence had 13 opportunities to err. Participants 
who saw two races on the first voting screen had a total of 14 opportunities to err. Error 
rates by voting method and error type are presented in Table 3 below. 
Table 3. Error rates by voting method and error type. 
Wrong Total 
Extra vote Undervote Choice Errors 
ORE 0% .59% .75% 1.34% 
Punch card 0% 1.97% .74% 2.87% 
Note that overvote error rates are not included in Table 3: while the punch card overvote 
rate was 0.16%, this type of error was not possible with the DRE. The punch card had a 
total error rate of more than twice that of the DRE (2.87% versus 1.34% respectively). A 
2 (information condition) x 2 (header highlighting) x 2 (races on first screen) x 4 
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(education level) x 2 (age median split) x 3 (error type) x 2 (DRE vs. punch card) 
ANOVA found this main effect of voting method on error rates to be statistically reliable, 
F(1, 83) = 14.62,p < .001. 
Of greater interest was the interaction between voting method and error type: 
while wrong choice and extra vote errors were comparable between the two voting 
methods, the punch card undervote error rate was much higher than was the DRE's. This 
interaction between voting method and error type was reliable, F(2, 166) = 14.47, 
p < .001 (Figure 12). 
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highlighting. When header highlighting was present however, punch card error rates 
increased; DRE error rates were not similarly affected by highlighting (and in fact 
decreased slightly when highlighting was present). This interaction between voting 
method and header highlighting on error rates was reliable, F(1, 83) = 18.86,p < .001 
(Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Interaction of voting method and highlighting on total error rates. 
Voting method error rates were also differentially affected by education level: 
while DRE error rates were approximately the same across education levels, punch card 
error rates were greater for those voters with a high school education or less (Figure 14). 
This interaction between voting method and education level on error rates was reliable, 
F(3 , 83) = 12.31 , p < .001, and was decomposed with a post-hoc custom interaction 
contrast F(1, 127) = 8.98,p = .003. 
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Figure 14. Interaction of voting method and education level on total error rates. 
In addition to increased punch card error rates, voters with a high school or less 
education level also suffered from an increase in undervote error rates (Figure 15). This 
interaction between education level and error type was reliable, F(6, 166) = 13.08, 
p < .001, and was decomposed with a post-hoc custom interaction contrast F(l, 127) = 
17.43,p < .001. 
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Figure 15. Interaction of education level and error type on total error rates. 
While the presence of header highlighting resulted in increased total error rates 
for voters with a high school or less level of education, highlighting did not similarly 
affect error rates for the other education levels (Figure 16). This interaction between 
education level and header highlighting was reliable, F(3, 83) = 3.47,p = .02. 
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Given the nature of the previously described interactions involving education, it 
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was not surprising that education level alone significantly impacted total error rates, with 
the high school or less education group having an error rate significantly greater than the 
mean error rate of the other three education levels combined (Figure 17). The main effect 
of education level on total error rates was reliable, F(3 , 83) = 9.19, p < .001. 
~ 
m 
0:
0 
s.... 
LU
C 
m 
0 
Q
G.  
 
.
itt I,..hoolo 
I ~f 
E  c i
Po~ ,I ad 
oro 
,  9,  
QJ 
+oJ 
ro 
ex:: 
s... 
0 
s... 
s... 
w 
s:: 
ro 
OJ 
~ 
0.070 
0.060 
0.050 
0.040 
0.030 
0.020 
0.010 
0.000 
High school or Some college 
less 
Bachelor's 
degree 
Education Level 
Figure 1 7. Main effect of education level on total error rates. 
Postgraduate 
degree 
Total error rates were also significantly impacted by header highlighting alone: 
error rates increased reliably when highlighting was present, F(1, 83) = 6.79,p = .01 
(Figw'e 18). 
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Of even greater importance than the main effect of highlighting on total error rates 
was its interaction with error type: while wrong choice and extra vote error rates were 
similar regardless of highlighting condition, undervote error rates were noticeably greater 
with highlighting than without (Figure 19). This interaction between highlighting and 
error type was reliable, F(2, 166) = 10.08,p < .001. 
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Finally, undervote error rates were significantly greater than wrong choice error 
rates, which in turn were greater than extra vote errors (Figure 20). This main effect of 
error type was reliable, F(2, 166) = 17.14,p < .001. 
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Intentional Undervotes 
Extra vote 
Not all undervotes are necessarily errors: a crucial distinction must be drawn 
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between undervote errors versus intentional undervotes. In real elections, the two cannot 
be distinguished from one another, as voter intent is unknown. However, the design of 
this laboratory study made such a distinction possible. Since participants in the directed 
information condition were told explicitly which candidates to vote for (and which races 
to skip), intentional undervote rates were examined for those participants in the 
undirected information condition only. Ninety-six participants were thus included in the 
following analyses. The intentional undervote rate ranged from 0 to .692, with a mean of. 
047 (SD = .118) (Figure 21). 
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I 
Punch card 
Intentional undervotes for races seven and nine (State Representative and Charter 
Review Board District 2) were significantly higher than the mean intentional undervote 
rate for all other races on the ballot. These were the only two races on the ballot that did 
not have a Democratic candidate. The State Representative race offered one REP 
candidate and a Write-In option, whereas the Charter Review Board District 2 race 
offered one REP candidate and one NPA candidate. During the exit interviews, if 
participants said they skipped a race, the experimenter asked a scripted follow-up 
question to determine why they chose to skip the race in question. For the two races in 
question, participants consistently stated they did not make a selection because no 
Democratic candidate was listed. This main effect of race number was reliable, F(2.50, 
167.68) = 12.21,p < .001, as seen with a 2 (header highlighting) x 2 (races on first 
screen) x 4 (education level) x 2 (age median split) x 13 (race number) x 2 (DRE vs. 
punch card) ANOVA. Note that because intentional omission rates for the first two races 
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(PresidentNice President and Senator) did not differ significantly-in fact, they were 
both zero-the two were averaged together. Otherwise, depending on whether 
participants saw one versus two races on their first voting screen, the number of levels for 
the within-subjects variable "race number" would have been 14 for half of all 
participants, and 13 for the others. 
Residual Vote Versus True Error Rates 
One unique benefit of this type of laboratory study is the opportunity it provides 
to directly measure effectiveness by recording actual error rates. In contrast, during real 
elections, effectiveness is assessed only indirectly via the residual vote. The residual vote 
is an indirect measure of accuracy commonly used in Political Science. It reflects the 
number of "lost" or unrecorded votes, and is computed as the difference between voter 
turnout and the number of valid votes cast for any given race. It is comprised of overvote 
errors, undervote errors, and intentional undervotes. Since voter intent cannot readily be 
determined in real-world elections due to privacy concerns, the residual vote does not 
address wrong choice errors, nor does it distinguish undervote errors from intentional 
abstentions. 
The true error rate for this study combined overvotes, undervotes, and wrong 
choice errors (recall that there were no extra vote errors, else they too would have been 
included). To calculate what would have been reported as the residual vote rate, 
overvotes, undervotes, and intentional undervotes were summed. Only the undirected 
information condition was of interest for these analyses, as it was most representative of a 
i entlV
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real election scenario. A distinction is often drawn between the residual vote rate for the 
top-most race on a ballot versus the remaining "down-ballot" races. Although previously 
Inentioned, it should be emphasized that residual vote rates of greater than 1 % for top-of-
the-ticket races are very rare, especially for President. 
For those participants who saw only a single race on their first voting screen, the 
true error rate for the top-most race was .047 (SD = .183), whereas the residual vote rate 
would have been reported as .012 (SD = .076) in a real election (Figure 22). The two 
measures of accuracy were not reliably different from one another, t(42) = 1.78,p = .08; 
the correlation between the two measures was reliable, r(42) = .81,p < .001. 
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F or those participants who saw two races on their first voting screen, the true 
error rate for the top-most race was .029 (SD = .118), whereas the residual vote rate 
would have been reported as .010 (SD = .069) in a real election (Figure 23). The two 
measures of accuracy were not reliably different from one another, t(51) = 1.43,p = .20; 
the correlation between the two measures was reliable (albeit lower than was the 
correlation for those voters who saw only a single race on the first screen), r(51) = .57, 
p < .001. 
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When examining the remaining down-ballot races combined, for those 
participants who saw only a single race on their first voting screen, the true down-ballot 
error rate was .024 (SD = .067), whereas the residual vote rate was significantly higher, 
at .090 (SD = .157) (Figure 24). The two nleasures of accuracy were significantly 
different fronl one another, t( 42) = 2.68, p = .01. Furthermore, the correlation between the 
two was low and unreliable, r(42) = .15,p < .001. 
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F or those participants who saw two races on their first voting screen, the true 
error rate for the remaining down-ballot races conlbined was .016 (SD = .033), whereas 
the residual vote rate was .040 (SD = .096) (Figure 25). The two nleasures of accuracy 
were not reliably different from one another, t( 51) = 1.71, P = .09. However, the 
correlation between the two was quite low and unreliable, r(51) = .07,p = .64. 
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Efficiency 
Data from 11 participants were not included in the following efficiency analyses: 
five participants were not included due to problems recording their DRE data in Flash, 
while the remaining six participants were excluded due to being outliers. Timing outliers 
were defined as observations falling outside three interquartile ranges (I Q Rs) from the 
25th or 75th percentiles of the distribution of ballot completion times, a definition 
consistent with that used in prior research. Overall ballot completion times were similar 
between voting methods. The n1ean ballot completion time for the DRE was 194 seconds 
(SD = 128 seconds), while the mean ballot completion time for the punch card was 185 
seconds (SD = 93 seconds) (Figure 26). 
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Although voting method did not significantly impact ballot completion times, 
education level and information condition together did have an effect on con1pletion 
times: in the undirected information condition, as education level increased, so too did 
ballot completion times (Figure 27). This effect was due to the amount of time that more 
highly educated voters spent reading the voter guide and referring back to it while voting. 
In contrast, voters with less education (especially those in the high school or less 
category) tended not to read the guide and instead did more straight-party ticket voting 
(mostly Democratic). This interaction of education level and information condition on 
ballot completion times was reliable, F(3, 79) = 3.33 , p = .02, as found with a 2 
(information condition) x 2 (header highlighting) x 2 (races on first screen) x 4 (education 
level) x 2 (age median split) x 2 (DRE vs. punch card) ANOVA. 
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Figure 27. Interaction of education level and information condition on ballot completion 
times. 
In addition to examining overall ballot completion times, one can also look at per-
race times for the DRE. Of greatest interest are times for those races on the first and 
second screens only (Figure 28). 
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Figure 28. Per-race times for races on the first two DRE screens only (Pres/VP and 
Senator on screen one; US Rep and Gov/Lt Gov on screen two). 
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Recall that half of participants saw two races on their first voting screen (both the 
Presidential and Senatorial races), whereas the other half of participants saw only a single 
race (Senatorial). Per-race times were not significantly different between the Presidential 
and Senatorial races for those participants who saw two races on screen one. They were 
therefore averaged together to create a single variable representing the mean per-race 
time those participants spent on the first voting screen. This allowed for more direct 
comparison with those participants who saw only a single race on screen one, since levels 
of the within-subjects variable "race number" were then equivalent across conditions. 
(No other per-race times were combined, since all participants saw the remaining races 
on the ballot, regardless of their exact experimental condition.) Per-race times for the 
second voting screen were of even greater interest, as this screen presented both the 
critical race (US Representative) and the race for GovernorlLt. Governor. 
Per-race times for the first two voting screens (i.e. the newly created "mean screen 
one" timing variable, US Representative race time, and Governor/Lt. Governor race time) 
were then analyzed in a 2 (information condition) x 2 (header highlighting) x 2 (races on 
first screen) x 4 (education level) x 2 (age median split) x 3 (race number) ANOVA. Per-
race times for those races on screens one and two were significantly longer in the 
undirected information condition than in the directed condition, F(l, 72) = 6.l0,p = .02. 
Although per-race times for screens one and two were somewhat slower with original 
Sarasota highlighting than without header highlighting, this difference was not 
statistically reliable at the conventional .05 alpha level, F(1, 72) = 3.83, p = .06. 
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Satisfaction 
DRE SUS data from all 144 participants were included in the following analyses. 
However, one participant's punch card SUS data were not used, as the participant failed 
to complete the survey in its entirety. Overall, SUS ratings for the DRE were nearly thirty 
points higher than punch card SUS ratings (Figure 29). Whereas the mean DRE SUS 
score was 93.3 (SD = 10.1), the mean punch card SUS score was only 64.9 (SD = 21.8). 
Furthermore, participants were much more variable in their opinion of the punch card. In 
addition to having a standard deviation more than twice that of the DRE, the range of 
SUS scores for the punch card was much wider. Whereas punch card SUS ratings had an 
abysmally low minimum value of 5 (max of 100), DRE ratings ranged from 50 to 100. 
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The main effect of voting method on SUS scores was reliable, F(1, 89) = 157.92, 
p < .001 , as seen with a 2 (information condition) x 2 (header highlighting) x 2 (races on 
first screen) x 4 (education level) x 2 (age median split) x 2 (DRE vs. punch card) 
ANOVA. Although age had no effect on DRE SUS scores, it significantly influenced 
punch card ratings: younger participants (those below the median age of 48 years) rated 
the punch card reliably lower than did older participants (above the median age of 48 
years) (Figure 30). This interaction of voting method and age on SUS scores was reliable, 
F(1, 89) = 5.01,p = .03. 
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Discussion 
While DREs offered no objective usability benefit in terms of efficiency, DREs 
received significantly higher subjective usability ratings than did punch cards. This voter 
preference for the DRE is not surprising given prior research. Also seen in prior research 
(Greene, 2008), was the significance of education in predicting the failure to cast a ballot; 
participants with lower levels of education (mainly those with high school or less) were 
more likely to make this specific type of post-completion error. Total error rates were 
reliably greater for the punch card than the DRE; an analogous relationship was found 
with undervote error rates. These effects may be due in large part to the difficulty some 
voters had inserting the punch card ballot properly. If not inserted all the way into the 
punch card holder such that the red tabs hold it in place, the ballot holes to be punched 
will not align properly with the associated candidate names. It should be emphasized that 
punch card error rates in Study 1 are a "best case" scenario. These punch cards were 
hand-scored; choices were counted as correct as long as voter intent could be inferred. 
Participants were therefore given credit for choices that machines may not have 
registered correctly due to pregnant, hanging, or dimpled chads. It is likely that punch 
card error rates may actually be worse in real elections. 
Furthermore, punch card error rates were reliably higher when header 
highlighting was used, whereas DREs were not affected. This may be due in part to the 
size of the punch card ballot versus the DRE screen. When highlighting was present, the 
punch card ballot appeared more visually "busy" than did the DRE. Additionally, 
highlighting increased total error rates for those voters with a high school or less 
education; punch card error rates were also reliably greater for those voters, whereas 
DRE error rates were fairly consistent across education levels. 
When comparing true error rates with what would have been reported as the 
residual vote in a real election, significant differences were seen between the two 
measures of accuracy for down-ballot races. It is encouraging that the two measures did 
not differ significantly for the top-most race on the ballot, yet the fact that correlations 
between the residual vote rate and true error rates were low and unreliable for down-
ballot races should be emphasized. These non-significant correlations suggest that the 
residual vote may not be as tightly coupled to true error rates as has been typically 
assumed. This in no way is meant to suggest that the residual vote does not provide 
useful information-in fact, it is difficult to imagine a viable means of replacing the 
residual vote with a more direct measure of accuracy without compromising voters' 
privacy. 
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The single most important result from Study 1 were the number of undervote 
errors voters made on the critical US Representative race. The critical race results seen in 
Study 1 offer strong support for the claim that human factors played a significant role in 
the Sarasota County 2006 election results. The initial omission rate for the US 
Representative race was 19.71 %, while the final undervote rate was 5.1 %. While the 
highlighting of race headers did not reliably predict initial omissions of the critical race, 
the number of races presented on the first voting screen did: when voters saw two races 
on the first screen, they were less likely to omit the critical race on the following screen 
than were voters who saw only a single race on the first screen. The critical race initial 
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omission rate of 19.71 % in Study 1 was greater than the 13.9% residual vote rate for that 
race during the actual election in Sarasota County. However, the final undervote rate of 
5.1 % in Study 1 was less, a disparity which clearly warrants discussion. 
The disparity between the final critical race undervote rate found in the laboratory 
versus that seen in the election is most likely attributable to the delayed touchscreen 
response on the Sarasota County DREs. As previously mentioned, the ES&S iVotronic 
systems used in Sarasota County suffered from a known problem with a "delayed 
response to touch." This was a problem of which state and county election officials were 
aware even before election day: ES&S stated in an August 15, 2006 letter to Florida 
election officials that the company had found an issue with the "smoothing filter" on the 
iVotronic touchscreens, which caused the machines to exhibit a "delayed response to 
touch." The necessary source code update and state-level certification needed were not 
completed, despite the manufacturer's statement that it planned to finish said repairs 
before the November 2006 General Election. Furthermore, Sarasota County's own 
records (incident reports kept by the Supervisor of Elections) described issues with the 
iVotronics on Election Day that necessitated multiple machines being "taken out of 
service on Election Day," issues such as their slow response to touch and need for a hard 
or extended touch before recognizing a vote. Finally, a machine-by-machine statistical 
analysis of election returns by the MIT political-science department chair, Charles 
Stewart II, found the undervote problem to be worst on touchscreens calibrated and set up 
on days the election staff was most busy (Amunson & Hirsch, 2008). 
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The letter from ES&S, Sarasota County's records, and Stewart's analyses all 
support the claim that the iVotronics in question suffered from touchscreen insensitivity/ 
miscalibration. However, the reason why such touchscreen issues would account for the 
increased undervote rate in Sarasota County relative to Study 1 requires further 
explanation. A recent study by Mascher, Cotton, & Jones (2010) directly addresses this, 
finding that a delayed touchscreen response decreased the number of voter navigation 
events. The finding that touchscreen insensitivity deterred proofreading was an 
unexpected result, as the primary aim of the study was to identify the voter interaction 
data that could be collected to enable informative investigation of touchscreen 
malfunction while simultaneously protecting voter privacy. In order for DRE event logs 
to actually be useful in examining interface/machine issues post-election, they must be 
sufficiently detailed. However, if event logs are so detailed they make it possible to 
reconstruct how someone voted, the right to a secret ballot is compromised. 
To balance these competing requirements, Mascher et al. (2010) recorded three 
types of data: button types, relative locations, and timestamps. Two type of locations that 
a voter touched were recorded: button touches and background touches. For background 
touches, the time of touch was recorded, whereas the location was not. For button 
touches, the type of button but not the identity was recorded, as were relative rather than 
absolute touch coordinates. The authors examined compressed ballots, dishonest 
summary screens, touchscreen miscalibration, and delayed touchscreen response. 
Obviously the latter manipulation is of primary interest for purposes of the current 
discussion. When manipulating touchscreen delay, the authors added a delay of 100 or 
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250 ms to the display-feedback time to simulate different degrees of touchscreen 
insensitivity. The addition of a 250 ms delay resulted in a decrease in the number of extra 
navigation events by subjects in that group, as compared to the 100 ms delay and control 
groups, which were similar to one another. Markedly fewer participants in the 250 ms 
delay group reviewed contests than did participants in the 100 ms delay or control 
groups. The authors offered two possible explanations for the decrease in contest review 
behavior. Either the increased delay makes voters more confident that they do not need to 
review their contest choices, or the delay is so annoying that voters are dissuaded from 
reviewing their choices: given that the authors received several vehement complaints 
from voters in the 250 ms delay group, they hypothesized that the latter explanation was 
more likely. 
One cannot help but agree, as a delay is extremely frustrating to users of any 
system-simply imagine a web session using dial-up rather than DSL or cable. An 
increased delay in system response time results in a large cost associated with navigation 
events by the user. In the case of the Sarasota 2006 election, a delayed touchscreen 
response likely reduced the number of voters who would take the additional time and 
endure the additional frustration associated with paging backwards to correct an 
undervote (whether or not voters noticed an undervote on the review screen is a separate 
issue altogether, see Everett, 2007). 
In conjunction with other research (Mascher et aI., 2010), Study 1 results strongly 
suggests that the 2006 Sarasota election was almost certainly a human factors problem. 
Nearly four years after the election, there are finally data that directly address the 
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question of whether poor ballot design affected Sarasota election results. Although the 
Jennings versus Buchanan court case lasted nearly 15 months, the issue of ballot design 
was never examined. Study 1 directly addressed this practical real-world issue, while also 
setting the stage for the introduction of cognitive modeling as a technique to potentially 
offer a more theoretical examination of the cognitive and perceptual mechanisms causing 
the voter error in question. 
COGNITIVE MODEL 
Based on Study 1 data, an initial cognitive model of the human voter was 
developed within the ACT-R framework. ACT-R is a unified theory of human cognition, 
a cognitive architecture that addresses both very low-level perceptual and motor 
capabilities of humans, as well as extremely high-level reasoning and decision making 
skills (ACT-R Research Group, 2009). The ACT-R framework has been used in a wide 
variety of research areas, ranging from basic visual search tasks (Tamborello, 2006; 
Tamborello & Byrne, 2006; Tamborello & Byrne, 2007) to modeling the approach and 
landing of pilots using synthetic vision systems (Byrne et aI., 2004). To date however, 
ACT-R has not been used to model human voters. The current model therefore offers a 
meaningful opportunity to make a unique contribution to the field, by introducing 
modeling as a new technique in the assessment of voting system usability. 
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Method 
Data Modeled 
The model was constructed based on Study 1 data from those participants in the 
undirected information condition, as this condition was by far more ecologically valid 
and interesting than was the directed condition. Within the undirected condition, only 
data from those participants who saw a single race on screen one were utilized, as this 
screen layout was analogous to the ballot used in the real-world Sarasota election. Data 
for those participants who saw a single race on screen one were divided into two groups: 
participants who truly undervoted in the critical race (i.e. cast their ballot with no 
selection made for US Representative) versus those who did not skip the critical race at 
all. Restricting the data in this fashion was necessary because if people who initially 
skipped the critical race (but fixed their mistake prior to casting a vote) had been 
included, their screen times would have reflected the additional time spent on the screen 
when changing a response. The current model sought to compare search and selection 
strategies for voters their first time on the screens of interest, and did not address choice 
changes or error recovery at all. For the current model, only the first two screens of Study 
1 were modeled (recall that screen two contained the critical US Representative race). It 
seemed probable that search and selection strategies might differ between participants 
based on the size of the difference in screen two times depending on whether the critical 
race was omitted or not. The size of this difference would not be explained solely by the 
additional encoding and motor movement required to select a candidate for that race. 
64 
Participants who truly undervoted in the critical race (who saw a single race on 
screen one and were in the undirected information condition) had a mean screen two time 
of 8.69 seconds (SD = 8.89). In contrast, the mean screen two time for those participants 
who did not skip the critical race (again, who saw a single race on screen one and were in 
the undirected condition) was much higher: 27.17 seconds (SD = 23.15). Mean screen 
one times for the two participant groups were 24.51 seconds (SD = 27.20) and 20.03 
seconds (SD = 11.27), respectively. However, it must be noted that the relatively small 
number of true critical race undervotes was further reduced due to limiting data to only 
the undirected information condition and single race on screen one: data from only three 
participants remained after these specifications were met. For those participants who did 
not skip the critical race at all, data from 30 voters remained after the specifications were 
met. A ratio of 10 to 1 is clearly unbalanced; one would ideally have many more human 
data points against which the model could be compared. However, this problem actually 
reinforces the idea that cognitive modeling could be a particularly useful tool in the 
voting arena. In the future, a sufficiently complete model could easily examine effects 
that would normally require prohibitively large numbers of participants to do so in 
laboratory studies. That level of model complexity was well beyond the scope of the 
current project, which was intended solely to introduce cognitive modeling as a potential 
ballot design evaluation tool in the voting arena. 
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Design 
The current model was designed to explore two different voting strategies that 
seemed plausible given the timing differences previously discussed: recalling a useful 
location from screen one and using it to direct visual search on screen two, versus reading 
screen two from top-to-bottom (or at least until a preferred candidate/party is encoded). 
These two strategies will be referred to as "recall" versus "read," and are discussed in 
more detail shortly. Two slightly different versions of the same basic model were initially 
implemented, with the short-term goal of determining whether use of a recall versus read 
strategy could account for the timing differences between those participants who 
undervoted in the critical race versus those who did not: the recall strategy resulted in a 
critical race undervote, whereas the read strategy did not. Obviously, a pressing future 
goal is the need to combine these two strategies into a single model: ideally, over the 
course of many model runs, the percentage of the time the model successfully executes 
the recall strategy (i.e. undervotes in the critical race) should approximate the Study I 
critical race undervote rate. The vast majority of the time, the read strategy would be 
selected over the recall strategy. 
Currently however, slightly different versions of the same model are used to 
represent the two strategies. The two models start with identical declarative knowledge, 
and do not begin to diverge procedurally until they reach the second voting screen. Since 
participants in Study I (and Study 2) would have already used the navigation buttons to 
move forward from the instructions screen to the first voting screen, both models start 
with general knowledge about the navigation buttons (e.g. their purpose, color, and 
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screen location). Both models have basic knowledge about political parties (e.g. that 
"DEM" is a party abbreviation) and offices (e.g. that "senator" is an office name), and 
start with the same goal: completing a ballot. When either model "sees" the LISP window 
for screen one, a cycle of productions fires repeatedly that find, attend, and code the 
highest unexamined text on the screen, checking to see whether the newly examined text 
is an office name. If the text is not an office name, the models again cycle through those 
productions until an office name is found. Each time a new piece of text is examined, the 
models encode its screen location and "usefulness" (i.e. an office name is useful when 
trying to complete a ballot, whereas the general ballot header is not). 
Once the first office is found, the models cycle through a similar series of 
productions that find, attend, and encode the top-most candidate name for that office, 
followed by analogous productions that find, attend, and encode the corresponding party 
abbreviation. The models cycle through these alternating productions until all candidate 
options have been encoded, at which time a retrieval request is made for the location of 
the "preferred" party. In each case, it was specified as being the Democratic party, since 
many participants voted a straight-party Democratic ticket. Most importantly, the three 
participants who truly undervoted in the critical race all selected the Democratic 
candidate for races one and three (having undervoted in race two). Once the models 
remembered their party preference, they located said party on the screen and clicked upon 
it with the mouse. The models verify that a checkmark indeed appears after they click the 
party, then resume searching the screen for another office. If another office is not found 
(which was the case on screen one, which presented only the Senator race), the models 
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make a retrieval request for the location of the forward navigation button, find it, and 
then click it. It is only at this point that the two models begin to diverge in terms of 
implementing a recall versus read strategy. The recall model makes a retrieval request for 
the location of a previously examined "useful" object, i.e. the location of the selection 
made on screen one, followed by the standard find, attend, encode, and click productions. 
In contrast, the read model implements the same strategy used on screen one: reading the 
screen from top to bottom before selecting a candidate. Both models were completely 
symbolic and deterministic, meaning that there was no variability in model candidate 
selections or model reaction times (i.e. mouse-click times). 
Materials 
The DRE ballot with which the model "voted" was similar to the DRE used by 
participants in terms of screen locations for offices, candidates, parties, and navigation 
buttons (Figures 31 and 32) and was programmed in LISP. 
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Figure 31. Model's mock DRE ballot, screen one: LISP version of first DRE screen 
(single race only) seen by participants in Study 1. 
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Figure 32. Model's mock DRE ballot, screen two: LISP version of second DRE screen 
(critical race screen) seen by participants in Study 1. 
Results 
Since the initial model was deterministic, each model run resulted in the same 
selections and times. Therefore, the standard measures of fit were not applicable; 
cOlnputing the correlation between model and human data, as well as the deviation 
between them, would only be meaningful with a non-deterministic model. As previously 
discussed, implementing this is a pressing future goal, as is modeling the condition in 
which participants saw two races on the first voting screen. Overall, the use of the recall 
70 
versus read strategies resulted in a qualitative match with the Study 1 human data in 
terms of the difference in times between screens one and two. However, the model was 
consistently faster than were the human participants. The qualitative predictions for Study 
1 were encouraging. Yet a major idea behind implementing the two model versions was 
trying to assess the validity of differing strategies: while the recall strategy worked 
correctly for Study 1, it would not predict the results seen in Study 2. In Study 2, there 
was no effect of race location on undervotes in the critical Attorney General race. Had the 
model strategy been correct in using the location of a previously useful item to direct 
visual search on the following screen, participants who saw a lone race at the bottom of 
the screen should have been significantly less likely to miss the critical race on the 
subsequent screen. While the model in its current implementation (i.e. two separate 
models) is by no means intended to be a complete representation of a human voter, it 
certainly remains a useful starting point upon which a more sophisticated model should 
be built. 
Future Directions 
Once a non-deterministic model were successfully implemented, the fit between 
model data and human data from Study 1 could be more accurately assessed using 
metrics of correlation (R2) and mean absolute deviation (MAD). Model parameters fit 
from Study 1 data would ideally be re-used for modeling Study 2 data in more depth. The 
most difficult test for any model is to make accurate predictions when facing novel 
stimuli. In the future, the model should be more flexible in handling novel stimuli, i.e. it 
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should be general enough to process novel stimuli without much rewriting of the model 
code. Assessing the accuracy of model predictions for the screens that differ between 
Study 1 and Study 2 should therefore be a future focus of model evaluation for Study 2. 
The fundamental model strategy of "recall" seems incorrect--or at least incomplete-
given Study 2 results, so model predictions for both Study 1 and Study 2 must clearly be 
reevaluated after future iterations of the model. 
Determining whether a model's predictions are accurate is not a simple yes or no 
question. There are increasingly rigorous levels of accuracy in model predictions. At the 
lowest level, the model should predict qualitative results, such as the ordering of group 
means seen in the human data. Predicting the ordering of condition means is usually the 
highest level of accuracy expected via heuristic evaluation in the absence of any user 
testing. Therefore, any increase in accuracy of model prediction beyond the ordering of 
group means would represent a unique benefit of cognitive modeling, providing 
information unlikely to be obtained by heuristic evaluation alone. 
A level above predicting the ordering of group means would be approximate 
quantitative predictions. This level of accuracy would be considered obtained if the future 
model predictions (again, for DRE error rates and ballot completion times only) were to 
fall within 20% of the actual human data values. Group means should be evaluated for 
the various experimental conditions (for example, when two races were seen on screen 
one, rather than just modeling the single race condition in Study 1), as well as the degree 
to which the model captures trends in the data. As previously mentioned, R2 and MAD 
would be used as evaluation metrics. 
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Finally, beyond approximate quantitative predictions, the highest possible level of 
accuracy would be perfect quantitative predictions of absolute values. Every aspect of the 
model's predictions would have to be exactly mirrored in the human data. Perfect 
quantitative prediction is not among the goals of even long-term future models, but 
achieving the ordering of group means would be expected, and ideally some level of 
approximate quantitative prediction as well. Irrespective of the degree of accuracy seen in 
future model predictions, areas where the model and human data deviate would continue 
to be informative. Disparities between model predictions and human data may help 
pinpoint limitations of the model itself, limitations in understanding human voters, or 
limitations in the data. Such identification of possible knowledge gaps shall always be 
necessary to help direct future research. 
Implications of Model Predictions for Study 2 
To the extent that model predictions of human performance for Study 2 were at 
least qualitatively correct, it would have indicated a degree of understanding ofthe 
cognitive processes of the voter, and how such cognitive mechanisms are affected by 
various aspects of interface design. Model predictions for Study 2 were not qualitatively 
correct, meaning that at least as measured by critical race undervote errors, people were 
not utilizing the "recall" strategy posited by the model. Although disappointing, this point 
of disparity between model predictions and Study 2 human data remains informative, 
helping to elucidate a specific area where our understanding of the interaction between 
voter and ballot (and perhaps between any user with a similar interface) may be lacking. 
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While it is possible that the small number of true critical race undervote errors seen in 
Study 2 were insufficient to ascertain any effects of top versus bottom race location, it is 
more likely that the model was not sophisticated enough to capture the subtleties of error 
generation seen in the human data. Future research should investigate disparities between 
model prediction and human performance, in an effort towards a more complete 
understanding of the human voter. 
Participants 
STUDY 2 
Method 
Except were otherwise specified, the experimental method for Study 2 was nearly 
identical to that used for Study 1. As the real intent of Study 2 was to collect human 
behavioral data against which model predictions could be compared, far fewer 
participants were used than in Study 1. For Study 2, a total of 50 participants were 
recruited from the larger Houston population: 25 female and 25 male. Ages ranged from 
19 to 79 years, with a mean age of 46.7 (SD=19.6 years), and median age of 43 years. As 
in Study 1, participants were diverse in terms of education, ethnicity, income, and voting 
experience. 
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Design 
A mixed design with one within-subjects variable and two between-subjects 
variables was used. The within-subjects variable was "DRE versus bubble ballot," since 
each participant completed the same ballot two times: once with a DRE and once with a 
paper ballot. Since the use of punch cards in Study 1 had no significant effect on the main 
variable of interest (critical race omissions), the non-DRE voting method for Study 2 was 
changed to paper ballots rather than punch cards. Not only are paper ballots easier to 
score than punch cards, but most importantly, paper ballots are more ecologically valid: 
they resemble provisional or absentee ballots, and in cases where DREs have been 
decertified, states have resumed use of optical scan paper ballots (rather than punch cards 
or lever machines). 
The first between-subjects variable was information condition: 38 participants 
were in the undirected information condition, while only 12 participants were in the 
directed information condition. A larger number of participants were used in the 
undirected condition since it was the only information condition of interest for model 
creation, prediction, and evaluation. In the undirected information condition for Study 2, 
all participants received the same instructions: vote consistently and as you would in a 
real election. Recall that in Study 1, there was no effect of changing instructions from 
those just described to "special" instructions telling people to make a choice in every 
race, hence the decision not to include the "special" instructions in Study 2. Whereas the 
directed condition in Study 1 instructed participants to intentionally omit certain races 
based on real-world roll-off rates (Nichols and Strizek, 1995), the directed condition in 
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Study 2 did not make use of roll-off. In other words, the sheet participants were given 
listing the selections to make while voting did not include any intentional omissions for 
Study 2. 
The second between-subjects variable was race location, which referred to 
whether the lone race on the second voting screen (i.e. the screen immediately preceding 
the critical race screen) was located at the top versus the bottom of the screen (Figures 33 
and 34, respectively; see Appendices for screenshots of the Study 2 DRE ballot in its 
entirety). 
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Figure 34. Screenshot of "bottom" race location condition for Study 2 DRE. 
Since the manipulation of header highlighting in Study 1 did not predict critical 
race omissions, highlighting was removed entirely in Study 2. An additional change in 
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Study 2 was the introduction of a "Charlotte County" screen (Figure 35), which was seen 
by all participants. 
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Recall that the critical race in Study 1 was the US Representative contest, seen on 
the second DRE voting screen. In Study 2, the critical race was the Attorney General 
contest, seen on the third voting screen. This screen Inimicked the problematic two-race 
screen used in Charlotte County in 2006, where the GovernorlLieutenant Governor race 
and the Attorney General race were presented on the same screen. The distribution of 
screen space between the two races was reversed from that on the Sarasota ballot; 
whereas the top race on the Sarasota ballot took up considerably less screen space than 
did the bottom race, the opposite was true of the Charlotte County ballot (Figure 36). 
Figure 36. Original critical race DRE screens from 2006 General Election in Sarasota 
County (top) and Charlotte County (bottom). 
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Materials and Procedure 
The paper ballot stands and DRE hardware for Study 2 were those used in 
previous research. With the exception of the Study 2 DRE ballot design changes 
previously described, DREs were similar in appearance to those used in Study 1 (see 
Appendices for individual screen shots from Studies 2 and 1, respectively). 
Overall, procedures for Study 2 were nearly identical to those used in Study 1. 
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Study 2 procedures differed in that paper ballots rather than punch cards were used, and 
all participants in the undirected information condition received the same instructions 
(recall that manipulation of instructions in the undirected information condition had no 
effect in Study 1). 
Participants again began by giving informed consent and receiving instructions. 
Participants in the undirected information condition were then offered a voter guide, 
while participants in the directed condition were given a sheet of paper listing all the 
selections they were to make while voting. Participants again voted first on a DRE, then 
completed a SUS questionnaire for that method. Participants then completed a paper 
ballot and corresponding SUS questionnaire. Participants in the undirected information 
condition then completed an exit interview. All participants completed a final survey 
packet, and were then debriefed and paid. 
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Results 
Effectiveness: Critical Race Results 
For Study 2, only those results directly relevant to the primary variable of interest 
(critical race omissions) shall be discussed. Data from aliSO participants were included in 
the following critical race analyses. On the DRE, eight of 50 voters skipped the Attorney 
General race their first time on that screen, resulting in an overall initial omission rate of 
16.00%. Of those eight participants, six corrected their critical race undervote error 
before casting their final ballot; five of those six voters made this correction pre-review 
screen, while only one voter corrected the mistake post-review screen. Interestingly, two 
of those six voters were in the directed information condition: even when they had a 
piece of paper listing the Attorney General race in front of them, they skipped it 
nonetheless. Two of the eight voters who initially skipped the Attorney General race 
never corrected their mistake, resulting in an overall final undervote rate of 4.00%. As 
the model was designed to be representative of voters in the undirected information 
condition only, critical race results were also computed for the undirected condition 
alone; the percentages were similar regardless of whether all participants (N=50) or just 
those in the undirected information condition (n=38) were used (Table 4). Therefore, data 
from all participants were included when predicting critical race omissions in the 
following logistic regression. 
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